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THE :MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE:
ORIGINS AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION
by Fredric I. Lederer•

No man should see lww laws or sausages are made. • •
Otto von Bismarck

I. INTRODUCTION
The tenth anniversary of the Military Rules of Evidence is an appropriate time to pause and reflect upon the rules, their implementation, and their future. In addition, enough time has passed to permit a more detailed discussion of the drafting of the rules than has
heretofore taken place.1
*Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps (USAR); Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary in Virginia. Com·
missioned in 1968, LTC Lederer served as a trial and defcll.S(.> COUJl.S(.>l at Fort DL~. New
Jersey, while an excess leave officer attending Columbia University School of Law.
Following receipt of his J.D. in 1971, he clerked for the late Frederick \'P. Bryan, United
States District Judge for the Southern District of New York. He was then assigned
as trial coWlSel and Courts and Boards Officer at Fort Gordon, Georgia. For the four
years following he was a member of the criminal law faculty at The Judge Advocate
General's School and received his LL.M. from the University of Virginia School of Law
in 1976. From 1977-78, he was a Fulbright-Hayes research scholar in Germany, study·
ing civilian and military European criminal law. During 1978·80 he was a member
of the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice Working Group where he was the
primary co-author of the Military Rules of Evidence. author of the Analysis of those
rules, and a co-drafter of the revision to articles 2 and 3 of the UCMJ. Having resigned
his Regular Army commission in 1980, he served as an Individual Mobilization
Augmentee military judge at Fort Eustis until 1987 when he was assigned as Individual
Mobilization Augmentee Deputy Commandant, The Judge Advocate General's School.
Nothing contained in this article is necessarily the opinion of any member of the De(mt·
ment of Defense in general or of The Judge Advocate General's School and its staff
and faculty in particular. The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of
Majors Lisowski and Warner; of The Judge Advocate General's School's Criminal Law
Division, Mrs. Diane Lederer, and Mrs. Ruth Knight in reviewing and commenting on
this article while in draft.
• *Nat'l L.J., December 24, 1984, at 2 (quoting Bismarck). There are other English
versions of this famous cynical observation, including "There are two thlngs that one
should never watch in the making, one is sausage. the other is legislation." Heritage
Foundation Reports, The Heritage Lectures; No. 144, November 20, 1987 (in this ver·
sion, the author added his own observation, "I think that the quote docs disservice
to sausage makers, who at least produce something that people want").
1The editor of the Military Law Review asked me to prepare this commemorative
article in light of my role as co-author of the Military Rules of E\·idence. Because I
often was not privy to the thoughts and actions of my co·authors and their relation·
ships with the institutions they represented, aspects of this article necessarily present my own perspective on the rules and best detail the Army's position on various
issues. Further, because most of the records reflecting the details of the writing of
the rules are no longer reasonably available. much of what follows necessarily stems
from memory. Memory is, however, notoriously fragile and imperfect. Should my
recollections prove inaccurate. I hope that those with more correct information will
set them right.
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Because of the diffuse nature of law reform and what is often the
extraordinary delay between an idea for change and its adoption,
determining with precision who should be credited with originating
any significant legal reform is often difficult. That, however, is not
the case with the Military Rules of Evidence. The "father" of both
the rules and our contemporary military criminal law reform process is Wayne Alley, who was a Colonel and the Chief of the Criminal
Law Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the
Army. 2 The Military Rules of Evidence owe their existence to many
different people,3 but the originator of the Military Rules of Evidence
project was clearly Colonel Alley. An extraordinarily competent attorney, Colonel Alley not only began and initially supervised the project, but also articulated the basic guidance to the drafters without
which drafting would still be going on.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were effective in 1975, and that
same year Colonel Alley formally proposed that the military revise
the Manual for Courts-Martial to adopt, to the extent practicable,
the new civilian rules. 4

IT. THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
The necessity for the codification cannot be appreciated fully
without an understanding of the place of the Manual for CourtsMartial in military law. Promulgated by the President under the
authority prescribed by Congress in article 36 of the Uniform Cod~
of Military Justice, 5 the Manual has the force of law and is subordinate only to the Constitution, treaties, and federal statutes.
As discussed in Trial by Court-Martial: 6
The Manual for Courts-Martial had its origins in private treatises
such as Winthrop's 1886 Military Law and Precedents dealing

2 After

promotion and service as Judge Advocate of United States Army Europl',
then General Alley retired to assume the post of Dean of the University of Oklahoma
School of Law, a position he left a few years later to becom(' a United States Distriet
Judge.
3 0ther individuals who have been credited with responsibility for the Military Hul('s
of Evidence include Deanne Siemer, who was the Department of Dcf('nSl' Gl•n<•ral
Counsel at the time of the drafting, and then Chief Judge Albert Fll'tch('r of Uw Court
of Military Appeals.
4Thlephone interview of Judge Wayne Alley (May 23, 1990) (hpreinaftl'r Int(•rvi(•wj.
5 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1988).
6
F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Trial By Court-Martial, Criminal Procl'dure in Uw Arnt('d
Forces§ 1-54.00 (pending 1991 publication) (unomitted footnotl's rl'numbl'rl'd).
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with military law in the Army conte.xt.'7' In 1889, one such
work, ''Instructions for Courts Martial and Judge Advocates,''
written by Captain Arthur Murray, was officially promulgated
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was expanded and published
in 1895 as a "Manual for Courts-Martial:·tsl
Murray's work served as the prototype of every Manual
issued during the next 15 years (1901, 1905, 1907, 1908,
1909, 1910). All were pocket-sized books with small type,
similar in size and style to the many other manuals .. . .The
Manual was published in a somewhat enlarged version in
1917, but was not basically changed until C-olonel Wigmore
revised it in 1921 to reflect the substantial changes in the
Articles of War that were enacted in the previous
year.... '9 ' A condensed edition of the Manual was
issued in 1928 which, with minor changes, remained in
force until 1949.1101
As a result of the 1948 amendments to the Articles of War, a
1949 Manual for Courts-Martial was promulgated. Soon after,
the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice required
the publication of the substantially revised 1951 Manual for
Courts-Martial, which for the Ili'St time covered all of the armed
forces. In turn, the Military Justice Act of 1968 gave rise to the
1969 Manual for Courts-Martial ....
Until the 1980 amendment to the 1969 Manual for CourtsMartial, the Manuals were basically .. how to guides" coupled
with basic hornbook type discussion and compilations of
necessary legal information. That format, consistent with all
of the prior Manuals, proved highly troublesome. Inasmuch as
the President had statutory authority under article 36 to
prescribe rules and procedures for courts-martial, the Manual
had the force of law. It was impossible to determine, however,
what portions of the Manual were intended to have that force.
Much of the 1969 Manual, for example, appeared to include

7'J'he Navy's equivalent of the Manual for Courts-Martial was Naval C.ou~ and I3oartb,
an official publication, that was amended in 1923 and 193i. Crump, fllrt/1: .·t History
of the Structure of Mili tary Justice in tlu.> U1zitecl States. 1921 ·1966, 17 A.F. L. Rl'\'.
55 (1975). It appears, however, that the current Manual is dl'SCl'ndl'd dtrectly from
the Army's publication.
S'fhe Army Lawyer: A History of The Judge Ad\'ocal<' Gen<'ral's Co~ 1775·1975,
94-95 (1975) (remainder of note omitted).
9
/d. at 95·96.
111/d. at 138.
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numerous past decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. It was
often impossible to tell whether the Manual meant to adopt
those decisions as positive law or was merely setting them forth
for the edification of the reader. This was especially true in the
portion of the Manual setting forth evidentiary matters. The
publication of the Military Rules of Evidence in rules format
began the format revision designed to emphasize what is binding and what is explanatory.
The codification of the Military Rules of Evidence thus began
against a backdrop of an amorphous partial evidentiary codification
that was set forth in the Manual often in hornbook fashion. Codification therefore required determination of the origins of specific
military evidentiary rules and their desired utility vis-a-vis the
civilian law of evidence.

ill. THE ORIGINS OF CODIFICATION
The Army proposed and strongly advocated evidentiary codification.'1 Codification was by no means unanimously supported by the
armed services, however. The Navy, for example, opposed it.' 2 In 1975,
in what could be said to be a harbinger of things to come, a member
of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy reported
on a Federal Bar Association seminar about the "new" Federal Rules
of Evidence and recommended that ''relatively low priority .. . be
given to their quick implementation in the military.'' 13 Among other
matters, he reasoned that the Manual for Courts-Martial already had
''a well thought out set of rules located in one convenient place,''
that the new evidentiary rules would generate ''a substantial amount
of litigation,'' that the civilian rules would have to be scrutinized and
adapted "to any peculiarities of the military system," and that a
"great deal of effort and expense . . . might be required in instructing each judge advocate in the field." 14
11
Judge Alley reports that General Persons, The Judge Advocate General of the Ar·
my while Colonel Alley was chief of the Criminal Law Division, was a strong sup·
porter of the project and essential to its success. Interview, supra note 4.
12See supra note 4. Lack of initial Navy support did not mean lack of Naval assistam.'P
later in the project. The Navy member on the Working Group, Commander Jim Pin·
nell, was an extraordinarily hardworking and dedicated colleague.
13
Memorandum, William M. Trott to Code 20, JAG:204.1:WMT:1kb (17 Mar. 1975).
14
Naval recalcitrance once again surfaced in 1979. On 16 May 1979, I forwarded the
following memorandum to The Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army:
1. Earlier today, LCMDR Pinnell, USN, distributed copies of a mcmornn·
dum/agenda concerning the 30 May meeting of the Joint Service Committe<.'
on Military Justice. Originally, the meeting was to be used to begin to review
the Working Group's product. The memo, however, five pages in length, pro·
pounds a series of questions which in effect call the entire revision effort of
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Codification took place under the auspices of the Joint Service
Committee on Military Justice. The process by which codification
occurred notwithstanding opposition15 and bureaucratic inertia best
was summed up in 1986 by then DOD General Counsel H. Lawrence
Garrett, III: 16
The Joint Service Committee was originally established as a
result of the problems encountered by the group that drafted
the 1969 version of the Manual for Courts-Martial. The drafting group reported that their task has been "monumental" due
to the failure during the fifties and sixties to consider adequately many of the developments in law that occurred after issuance
of the 1951 Manual (which implemented the new Uniform Code
of Military Justice). An ad hoc group was formed, and a formal
charter was signed by the services Judge Advocates General
in 1972 assigning to the Committee responsibility for considering amendments to the UCMJ and the Manual. The chairmanship rotated among the services on a biennial basis, with the
group operating primarily on the basis of consensus.
In 1975, the chairmanship rotated to the Chief of the Army's

Criminal Law Division, then-Colonel \Vayne Alley ....
The original motivation for establishment of the Joint Service
Committee-the need to keep the Manual current with develthe past year into question. The memo was authored by CMDR Ed Byrnt', Chief
of Criminal Law of the Navy, and represents his personal views rather than those
of the Navy TJAG. He is the Chairman of the Joint Service Committe-e.
2. Chief Judge Fletche~; acquainted with the memo by Bob Mueller of the Work·
ing Group, joined our meeting to voice his strong concern O\'er what he viewed
as a possible attempt to "scuttle" the evidence project . . ..
3. . . . At present, this is hopefully a minor matter that may be rcsol\'cd without
great effort. However, it does provide the possibility of a major confrontation
with DOD General Counsel and the Court of Military Appeals on one side and
the Navy (and possibly the Air Force as well) on the other...
Memorandum, Major Fredric Lederer to Major General Law~nce Williams, subject:
Revision of the Rules of Evidence (16 l\lay 1979).
1
S0ne can only speculate as to why most lawmakers choose to proceed witlt or ~frnin
from law refonn. Absent a pressing visible need for change, usually the ~fonnt'rs'
claim of future improvement in the Jaw is countered by claims of contemporary legal
adequacy and needless expense. In actual fact, one can argue that most people ~
inherently comfortable with the status quo and ~luctant to change. particularly if
they have invested great personal effort in the thing to be changed. ThiS is oftt'n
summed up by the old adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Unfortunately, the adage
discourages improving a product or process assumed to be adequate: \\'(' would probably still be living in caves if we took it seriously.
16Garrett, Rejlections on Contemporary Sources of Military LaiL', Tite Anny Lawyer,
Feb. 1987, at 38, 39-40.
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opments in the law-was a matter of particular concern to Colonel Alley. In January, 1975, President Ford signed legislation
establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence, which contained
reforms greatly simplifying trial of criminal and civil cases.
Other changes in federal criminal law, particularly as a result
of Supreme Court decisions, also created the potential for
parallel changes in the Manual and the Code. In view of article
36, UCMJ, which generally requires us to follow federal criminal
rules of evidence and procedure to the extent practicable and
not inconsistent with the Code, Alley believed a vigorous and
systematic review effort was necessary to comply with the
Code.
Despite these opportunities, Colonel Alley found his chairmanship to be a source of frustration rather than reward. In
the absence of a crisis, the requirement for consensus proved
to be a powerful disincentive to developing the level of effort
on a joint service basis necessary to produce reform proposals.
By late 1977, little had been accomplished. At that time,
however, one of my predecessors, Deanne Siemer, developed an
interest in military justice and asked a member of our staff to
meet with the services to assess the legislative process. Colonel
Alley readily seized on this chance to break the logjam. He
recommended that an effort be initiated to adopt the Federal
Rules of Evidence, with appropriate modifications, into the
Manual for Courts-Martial. Alley suggested that the project
would serve three separate goals:
first, it would meet the Article 36 requirement that we
generally apply federal rules; second, it was a discrete project that could be accomplished with one year's concerted
effort, establishing a pattern of work that the Joint Service Committee could carry into the future; and third, the
efficiencies in trial practice generated by the new rules
would demonstrate to the services the benefits of serious
attention to law reform on a sustained basis.
Colonel Alley's initiative was adopted by the General Counsel
who established the Evidence Project as a DOD requirement
and placed a member of our staff on the working groupP
Drafting began in early 1978. Ms. Siemer forwarded the final draft
l1Jd.
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to the Office of Management and Budget on September 12, 1979.18
Colonel Alley had been optimistic; codification took somewhat longer
than the year he had predicted. Despite the complexity of the process and service disagreement,l 9 the project was a success, and on
March 12, 1980, the President issued an executive order amending
the Manual for Courts-Martial and promulgating the Military Rules
of Evidence, effective 1 September 1980.20

IV. THE FORMAL CODIFICATION
STRUCTURE
The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice Working Group
drafted the Military Rules of Evidence. The Working Group "was
composed of two representatives from the staff of the Court of
Military Appeals, and one representative from the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Coast Guard, and Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, respectively. The Marine Corps did not participate
at the drafting level." 21 The \Vorking Group was responsible to the
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, which then was composed of the chief of the criminal law branch of each of the Armed
Forces, including the Marine Corps, and one representative each from
the Office of the DOD General Counsel and the Court of I\filitary Appeals.22 Although the Joint Service Committee was the supervisory
agency and reviewed the rules, its role in the codification proved to
be relatively minor; 23 most disputes were resolved within the Working Group or outside the formal codification structure.
Article 67(g) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 2 "' creates the
"Code Committee," a body composed of The Judge Advocate General
of each of the Armed Forces, the Director of the Marine Judge AdDOD E.O. Doc. 241 (September 12, 1979).
e.g., infra note 43 and accompanying te.xt.
20Exec. Order No. 12,198, 45 Fed. Reg. 16,932 (1980).
21Lederer, The Military Rules of Et•idelzce: An Ot~rt•icw, 12 The Advocat<.> 113, ll.J
(1980). The Working Group members who drafted the rules were CommandL>r Jim Pm·
nell (Navy), Major Fredric Lederer (Anny), M3jor James Potuk (Air Fort'L>), Ueuten·
ant Commander Thm Snook (Coast Guard), Mr. Robert MuellL>r (Court of ~tilitary Ap·
peals), Ms. Carol Scott (Court of Military Appeals), and Mr. Andrew Effron (DOD GenL>rnl
Counsel).
22'fhe Joint Service Committee representatives of these institutions abo S<.>n·l'd on
the Working Group.
23'fhis is not to minimize the importance of the Joint Sen•ice Commttt~. It spent
a significant amount of time reviewing the rules and madt' a numbt'r of tmportant
decisions in the process.
24 Unifonn Code of Military Justice, art. 67(g), 10 li.S.C. § 867(g) (19SH) [heretnaftt'r
UCMJ).
18
19

8~
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vocate Division, and the judges of the Court of Military Appeals. 26
The Code Committee met once to resolve several minor interservice
conflicts. 26
The final draft of the Military Rules of Evidence ''was forwarded
through the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to the
Office of Management and Budget, which circulated the rules to the
Department of Justice and other agencies, and finally forwarded
them to the President via the White House Counsel's office." 27
This sterile description of the "chain of command" fails to impart
an accurate picture of how the rules actually were drafted and
approved-a picture that only can be viewed via a detailed rendition of the actual codification process.

V. CODIFICATION BEGINS
The Working Group began its activities in early 1978. Because I
did not join it until approximately August 1978, 28 I lack first hand
knowledge of its early activities. Clearly, the Working Group had
begun the drafting process. I believe, however, that it had not gone
into "high speed operation" primarily because higher authority initially had failed to supply it with adequate guidance.
The most important question faced by the Working Group was the
definition of its mission. Although the Working Group's charter was
to draft new evidentiary rules using the Federal Rules of Evidence
as its basis, the scope of its task was unclear. Were the Federal Rules
of Evidence to be adopted verbatim, modified slightly, or used simply
as a point of departure? Given the option, each member of the Working Group, for example, preferred to modify substantially, if not to
redraft entirely, at least one of the Federal Rules of Evidence.20 Draft25
Th the best of my knowledge, the Coast Guard General Counsel participated on
behalf of the Coast Guard.
2
60ne such conflict concerned whether to retain Rules 407, 408, 409, and 411 because
of their civil application.
27 Lederer, supra note 21, at 113, 114.
28 Replacing then Major John Bozeman.
29
lt was apparent to the Working Group that a number of the Federal Hules of
Evidence badly needed clarification. Although Fed. R. Evid. 607 permits impeaeh·
ment of a party's own witness, for example, Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) permits impeach·
ment by "prior bad acts" only on cross-examination, "slippage" that is questionable.
More important was Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2)'s limitation on impeachment by prior con·
viction to convictions involving "dishonesty or false statement." It was clear that
"dishonesty" was dangerously misleading. See, e.g., Memorandum, Fred Lederer to
the Evidence Committee, subject: Commentary to the Military Rules of Evidence 6
(7 Feb. 1979).

12

1990]

ORIGINS AND JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION

ing appeared to be an interminable process when Colonel Alley gave

the Working Group the "marching orders.. that made the project
possible. He instructed the Working Group that it was to adopt each
Federal Rule of Evidence verbatim, making only the necessary wording changes needed to apply it to military procedure. unless a
substantial articulated military necessity for its revision existed, or,
put differently, unless the civilian rule would be unworkable within
the armed forces without change.
Colonel Alley's instructions not only made pragmatic sense, they
incorporated a fundamental philosophical position: military evidentiary law should be as similar to civilian law as possible. Military
evidentiary law as found in the Manual for Courts-Martial had begun
as nearly identical with prevailing civilian federal law, 30 in part due
to the efforts of Professor Wigmore, author of the 1921 revision.
Nevertheless, the process of incorporation of case rulings without
periodic systemic revision had created a wide gap between civilian
and military practice in some areas, a gap that the advent of the
Federal Rules of Evidence broadened considerably. Colonel Alley intended not just that the codification reflect the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but that allfuture military evidentiary law echo it as well,
unless a valid military reason existed for departing from it. 31
Although generally dispositive, 32 Colonel Alley's instructions left
open several major policy questions. One was raised in the debate
over adoption of Rule 201, Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts. Commander Pinnell argued most strongly that the distinction between
30Cf. Fed. R. Evid.

The [first] Manual contained no formal discussion of evidence and only a few
brief notes on credibility, competency and proof of intent. The author advised
that the court should follow as far as possible the evidentiary rules of tlte criminal
courts of the United States-but that since members were not ven;cd in legal
science they should not be overly concerned with technicalities.
The Army Lawyer: A History of The Judge Advocate Genernl's Corps. 1775·1975, 95
(1975).
31
This was ensured by Mil. R. Evid. 1102, which provides for the automatic adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence unless the President instructs
othenvise.
32 \Vhat was ..unworkable" or not "practicable" in article 36 terms wm. a frequent
subject of debate. Arguing that they were unnecessary and thus not mandated, the
court representative, for example, objected to modifying Rules 803 and 80-1to preserve
previously articulated hearsay exceptions (and to expand them to laboratory reports
and chain of custody receipts) as well as to alter Rule 902 to include military atte5ta·
tion certificates. Similarly, the Air Force objected to revising Rule 110'~ to provide the
President six months before an amendment to the Federnl Rules of Evidence
automatically applied to the Armed Forces. Occasionally, altemativl' "'te5ts"' were
argued. The Air Force opposed Rule 507, Political Vote. on the grounds that it was
unnecessary and ridiculous. Post Joint Service C~mmittee summary submitted to Col·
onel Wayne Hansen (July 1979).
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adjudicative and legislative facts in the Federal Rules of Evidence
was so unintelligible and confusing as to make it unworkable in the
military context. Although persuasive in the context of Rule 201,
redrafting it would have set a precedent that would have permitted
substantial alterations in otherwise acceptable rules. 33 Ultimately, a.J
the Working Group decided that although Federal Rule 201 was either
poorly written or unduly sophisticated, it was workable. 35 We
therefore adopted it, 36 mooting the general philosophical debate.
A less significant question concerned rules primarily of application to civil cases. The Navy initially opposed retention of Rules 407
(Subsequent Remedial Measures), 408 (Compromise and Offer to
Compromise), 409 (Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses) and
411 (Liability Insurance) on the grounds of irrelevancy. Although
clearly the original intent of most if not all of these rules applied
solely to civil cases, 37 they were not necessarily inapplicable to

33

My internal report on the matter read:
(Federal] Rule 201(a) allows judicial notice of adjudicative facts only [,) attempting to distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts. The distinction
is a difficult one, even for the author of the concept. Accordingly, thl' Navy
representative moved to eliminate the word, "adjudicative" leaving only th<'
word "facts." This precipitated a major argument as [to] the Group's purpose
with the Air Force and COMA members stating that their intent was to adopt
the Rules without modification except as required by military operations. The
Navy member argued that it was ridiculous to adopt a rule that is poorly drafted
and which can be improved (in this case, most of the States have refused to
adopt the specific rule). CPT Effron of DOD took an intermediate position agreeing that if a Rule would cause so much confusion as to render it virtually useless,
it should be modified. Discussion of this specific Rule was deferred pending
further study as to its accepted interpretation in the civilian courts. The general
philosophical debate has, however, importance beyond the specific rule and
represents a continuing clash between the representatives. While I would agreP
with the Navy's position personally, it seems clear that too much work has bPl'n
done to reasonably push that position. Consequently, my position at present
is that we must adopt the specific Federal Rule unless it is either contra to
military law (to be interpreted rather widely) or is so poorly drafted as to makP
its adoption almost an exercise in futility ....
Memorandum, Fed. R. Evid. Working Group Meeting, from MAJ Fredric Lederer to
COL Doug Clause, para. I.e. (1 Sept. 1978).
34
This occurred following a meeting of members of the Working Group with Professor Steve Saltzburg, University of Virginia School of Law, and a personal meeting
with Professor Edward Imwinkelried, then of the University of San Diego Law School.
Memorandum, Fred Lederer to the Evidence Committee, subject: Commentary to thl'
Military Rules of Evidence (7 Feb. 1979).
35 Cf. id. at 2.
36The Working Group did, however, draft a unique Rule 201A, Judicial Notic(• of
Law, to clarify matters ordinarily dealt with in the civilian courts by Fed. R. Crim.
P. 26.1. Mil. R. Evid. 201A analysis at A22-4.
31See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 409: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by any i(\jury is not admissibl(•
to prove liability for the i(\jury.''
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criminal cases, particularly considering military offenses based on
negligence. In rmal voting at the Joint Service Committee, on May
30, 1979, the Air Force opposed Rule 408; and the Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps opposed Rules 409 and 411. The Joint Service Committee adopted Rule 408 and sent Rules 409 and 411 to the Code Committee, which adopted them.
Two major policy questions remained: 1) whether to codify
privilege rules; and 2) whether to codify the law of search and
seizure, interrogation, and eyewitness identification.
Although the draft Federal Rules of Evidence had included privilege rules, they proved highly controversial, and Congress elected
to proceed without them.38 The Manual for Courts-Martial, however,
had a comprehensive body of these rules. The Working Group readily decided that because many military personnel were stationed in
places where they did not have easy access to legal advice, accessibility and certainty required the adoption of specific privilege rules. 39
The "constitutional" issues proved more comple..x. Although determining what constituted academic comment and what was positive
law in the area was particularly difficult, the Manual's evidentiary
chapter extended to search and seizure, interrogation, and eyewitness identification as well as to more traditional evidentiary
topics. Not only did the Federal Rules of Evidence fail to address
these matters, no other codification had either. 40 To the extent that
these matters were of importance, they could have been placed in
the planned procedural revision of the Manual. 41 Although that
would not have been unreasonable, it was undesirable if only because
the "constitutional" 42 portion of the Manual governed matters of
enormous importance that occurred daily throughout the armed
forces and that customarily were dealt with by nonlawyers. After
debate, the Working Group elected to codify the area, albeit in a very
careful fashion that codified some issues43 while leaving others to
case law development. The drafters' intent was clear and plain: the
new rules were to function as positive law rather than as a useless
38This left only Fed. R. Evid. 501 recognizing and establishing a federal common
law of privileges.
39See infra text accompanying notes 80-82 (discussion of the prl\'ilcge rules).
40'!b date, no other jurisdiction has codified these topics.
41That revision ultimately produced the Rules for Courts-Martial.
42'fhis is, of course, somewhat of a misnomer as interrogation is go\·emed as well
by UC.MJ art. 31.
43'fhe issues that were codified were those that dealt with matter.; such as searches
and inspections, normally handled by nonlawycrs.
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summary of what the drafters thought the current law to be.44 The
decision to codify remained controversial, however, and, at the last
possible moment, the Air Force attempted to ''missile'' the search
and seizure codification.45
The contrary position, see, e.g., United States v. Postle, 20 M.J. 632 (N.M.C.M.R.
1985), is difficult to understand. The President has power to create rules of both
evidence and procedure under article 36, augmented by his constitutional authority
as Commander in Chief. Clearly, the President may limit the government's action in
these areas (as distinguished from expanding it beyond the limits imposed by the Con·
stitution or statute):
Normal rules of statutory construction provide that the highest source authority
will be paramount unless a lower source creates rules that are constitutional
and provide greater rights for the individual. As applied to the Military Rules
of Evidence, if a section III search rule is more restrictive of government con·
duct than Supreme Court constitutional interpretation, then the military should
be bound by the more restrictive, constitutional, subordinate rule. It follows
then that military trial and appellate courts should not be free to ignore the
Military Rules of Evidence and adopt reasonableness as the standard for assess·
ing fourth amendment conduct.
Gilligan & Smith, Supreme Court-19891lmn, Part II, The Army Lawyer, May 1990,
at 85, 89 (calling into question the value of codifying "constitutional rules").
The careful crafting of the rules makes it apparent, even if one ignored all other
evidence of intent, that some rules were to be absolutely binding while others wen•
to use case precedent. See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314 (k). Th argue that the constitutional
codification was simply declarative of then existing law is to ignore the intent and
structure of the rules and to defy common sense. The Working Group assumed that
desirable Supreme Court case law changes would be adopted through amendment
of the rules, a process that has in fact worked handily. See generally infra text accompanying notes 118-144.
45 0n 30 July 1979, Brigadier General Th.ylor, Acting The Judge Advocate General
of the Air Force, wrote to Major General Harvey, The Judge Advocate General of thl'
Army, expressing his concern over the codification of search and seizure noting that
the rules would impact " on the present and future state of discipline, readiness and
command authority." General Harvey responded briefly, endorsing the rules. Subse·
quently, the Department of the Air Force nonconcurred with that part of the rules.
Memorandum, Colonel Carl R. Abrams, Office of Legislative Liaison, for Director,
Legislative Reference Service, DOD General Counsel (30 Aug. 1979). In relevant part,
page two of this memo stated:
The Department of the Air Force nonconcurs with rules 311-317, which
establishes rules governing search and seizure in trials by courts-martial, for
the following reasons:
(1) In many cases, the rules purport to overrule United States Court of
Military Appeals decisions which are based on constitutional principles.
Adoption of these rules may create disorder, in that the court, since the
decisions were based on constitutional principles, will no doubt invalidate
those provisions of the Manual.
(2) The rules establish concrete rules of law governing searches and
seizures. In the military environment, search and seizure is a very fluid
area of the law. It may well be that we should, as the Federal Courts have
done, leave interpretation to the courts. In addition, because this area
of the law is so fluid, we may be bound by rules in the Manual which
are more restrictive than those advanced by the Supreme Court.
We recognize, however, that at least four of the rules (311, 312, 315 and 317)
which provide procedural guidance to the field could be useful and extremely
beneficial to both judge advocates and nonlawyers. We could support the rctl'n·
tion of those rules. Further we also could support many of the other rules, but
44
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The actual initial codification process was simple. Individual
members of the Working Group took responsibility for specific areas
or rules, prepared drafts, and circulated them. The Working Group
would then meet and debate policy and text. Particularly in the latter part of the phase, meetings were held at the Court of Military
Appeals, away from the usual demands of the telephone.
By intent, each member of the Working Group represented an
armed force or other institution and was the primary liaison with
that institution.46 What differed radically was the nature of the relationship between the Working Group representative and the institution represented. Commander Pinnell, responsible to Captain Ed
Byrne, briefed Navy JAG flag officers periodically and circulated rules
drafts throughout the Navy JAG Corps. The Army functioned quite
differently. Although General Persons, The Judge Advocate General
of the Army when Colonel Alley created the codification project,
showed a great deal of interest in it, subsequent general officer supervision within the Army was virtually absent. 47 Circulation of the proposed rules within the Army similarly was limited; The Judge Advocate General's School, 48 members of the judiciary, and government
only after careful evaluation and redraft.
Interestingly, aspects of this futile effort are contradictory. Only on~ rul~ arguably
extended the power of the government-Rule 313(b), Inspections. All th~ others were
within the clear parameters of case law. Yet, the memo confid~ntly predicted action
by the Court of Military Appeals to "overrule" the rules while, at th~ sam~ tim~. it
expressed concern that the Air Force might be bound by rules more restrictive than
necessary. At the same time that the Air Fore~ obj~tro to tlte search and seizure
rules, it failed to mount a broadside attack on the confession and int~rrogation rules,
301-306.
The Court of Military Appeals has invalidated only on~ of Ute constitutional rules:
the part of Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(2) that permitted a commander to delegate th~ power
to authorize searches, United States v. Kalscheur, 11 M.J. 373 (C.M.A. 1981), and Its
unprecedented holding nullified a rule that did nothing more than to restate prior
law. It has, however, periodically ignored them. See Gilligmz & Smilll, Suprt"'mt•
Court-1989 7lmn, Part II, The Army Lawyer, May 1990, at 85 n.45.
Mter the decision was made to promulgate the rules, the Army, Na\'y, Marin~ Corps.
and Coast Guard participated in a worldwide training program conducted by tlten Com·
rnander Jim Pinnell and Major Fred Lederer. With the e.xception of one installation
in Colorado Springs, however, the Air Force chose not to participate. Although no con·
nection between the above memo and the Air Fbrce boycott ever was made, on~ must
wonder whether a connection actually did e.xist.
460ne exception to this general rule was that th~ Navy representati\'e, Commander
Pinnell, represented the Marine Corps as well as th~ Na\•y.
4 71)uring the drafting phase, I reported regularly to Colonel James Clause, Chi~f.
Criminal Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, for whom
I worked. Generally speaking, Colonel Clause eitller concurred in my positions or per·
mitted me substantial discretion. Soon after the rules were in ncar final form, Colonel Clause was reassigned to tlle Army Court of Military ~view and replaced by th~n
Colonel, now Brigadier General, Wayne Hansen.
4 8'fhe Judge Advocate General"s School Criminal Law Oi\'ision supplied se,·~n pages
of thoughtful and detailed comments, a number of which led to altemtions of th~ rules.
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and defense appellate counsel received drafts and were asked to comment. The various members of the Working Group held differing
degrees of independence. 49 To the best of my knowledge, however,
these differences had virtually no effect on debate within the Committee. 50
Because the Working Group members were institutional representatives, the Working Group's decisions tended to be final, and few
matters required formal consideration at higher levels. The Joint Service Committee did meet to resolve several interservice disputes, 61
and the Code Committee met once to discuss the rules. 52
After a final official coordination from the Department of Defense
General Counsel's office, 53 the Working Group forwarded the rules
to the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, and

49 Among the armed forces representatives, I held the largest degn'e of individual
discretion. Colonel Clause directed me to draft a hearsay exception for laboratory
reports, Mil. R. Evid. 803(6) & (8), and not to attempt to modify Mil. H. Evicl. ()]fi.
Otherwise I was permitted nearly unlimited independencC'.
50Despite occasional efforts of the Navy representativC' to bring to bC'ar thC' allC'~Wd
unified position of senior Navy leadership. Of course, the Working Group was dC'C'ply
concerned about the political feasibility of its changes. In this regard. although lw
was not technically chair of the committee, Andrew Effron hC'ld what usually was
viewed as final authority because the DOD GenC'ral Counsel dC'tC'rminC'd thC' natun•
of the final draft that would leave the Pentagon. A great deal is owC'd to Mr. Effron
for his extraordinary efforts to ensure completion of the rulC's in a form of whkh all
could be proud.
510ne of my "favorite" memories of the Joint Service CommittC'C' com·C'rncd tht• draft
of Rule 321, Eyewitness Identification. In light of the potentially substantial <·hnngC's
made in the Rule. I had recommended that the Analysis contain a suggC'stion that
prior to an attempted government identification of the accus<'d, defensC' counsel <·ould
ask the trial judge for permission to seat the accused in thC' gallC'ry. A mC'mb<>r of tlw
Committee-not the Army representative I hasten to add-exclaimC'd in shock, "You
know we can't do that, we'd never get any identifications."
5 2'fhe most important decision made by the Code CommitteC' conc('rnt•d tht• applkation of former testimony to courts-martial, artide 32 investigations, and similar proceedings. Unfortunately, its resolution of this issue creatC'd morP troublP than it solwd.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
~J'fhe coordination process proved to be quite instructive. It o<TUrrC'd, with a "short
fuse," after a number of members of the Working Group had bC't'n givC'n lNlW with
the express knowledge of, and presumed implicit consent of, thC' DOD General Counst•l's
Office. It was apparent that the DOD General Counsel did not wish thC' servk<•s to
challenge the circulated draft, particularly changes that had bC'C'n madC' in lwr office. The services responded to the DOD draft with numC'rous propost•d <·orn•ctions.
These ranged from a request to restore proposed RuiC' 412A, l'~rC'sh Complaint, through
objection to changing the judge's duty to advisC' an apparC'ntly uninformC'd witn('ss
of his or her self-incrimination rights from "should advise" to "may advise," to a protC'st
at the omission of "anus or vagina" and the substitution thereof of "other body
cavities" in Rule 312(c), Intrusion into Body Cavities. Memorandum, MG ClausC'n, Acting Army TJAG, for General Counsel, DOD, 23 July 1979, subject: DOD Draft of tlu•
Military Rules of Evidence (14 Aug. 1979).
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the Office of Management and Budget for coordination. After minor
changes in response to comments by the Department of Justice, the
Working Group sent the rules to the White House for the President's
signature.
After the Working Group !mished preparing the rules, the Drafters'
Analysis was written. For each new rule, the Analysis was to contain its origin, the changes it made in military law, and, as appropriate, practice commentary. I wrote the Analysis, and the Working Group and the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice
reviewed and edited it. Concurrent with the concluding portion of
the rules project, Commander Pinnell and I traveled around the world
presenting on-site instruction for Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and
Marine personnel. 54

VI. SELECTED RULES
Although space does not permit a detailed review of each of the
rules, discussion of the origin of some of the rules is illustrative of
the rule-making process and perhaps of independent interest.

A. PRESUMPTIONS
Article ITI of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies in Rule :301
the Thayer ''burst the bubble'' form of presumption66 for presumptions not otherwise defined by statute or case law. Although the
Manual dealt with presumptions to some degree, presumptions were
not codified as part of the rules. Instead, Section III was used for
the codification of the law of search and seizure, interrogation, and
eyewitness identification. Th the best of my memory, presumptions
were not codified, not because of their inherent difficulty and complexity, 56 but rather because members of the Working Group failed
to understand fully their importance. Instead, the Working Group
quickly accepted the decision of the framers of the Federal Rules
of Evidence not to codify presumptions in criminal cases and refused
to adopt Federal Rule 301 because of its application to civil cases. 57
54The Air Force did not participate. See supra note 45.
5S'fhis shifts only the burden of production (also called tlt<.> burdl.'n of gomg fono.-ard).

Once an adequate antount of evidence is introduced to counter the presuml'd fact,
the "bubble bursts" and the presumption vanishes. It is named after Profcs.orTimyer.
56ln lieu of Fed. R. Evid. 301, states have often adopted, for <.>xample, th<' ~(organ
true rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden of proof ru. w<.>ll as the burden
of production. Still more difficult in light of tlte Bill of Right.!> are presumpttoru. an
criminal cases. Compare Fed. R. Evid., art. III, with Uniform Hult'S of Evtdence. an. Ill.
571 believe that the primary proponent of noncodifi<."dtion wru. Mr. Effron, who may
well have understood entirely the law and issues in\'ol\'ed-soml.'tlting I surely did not.
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In retrospect, the omission of presumptions from the Military Rules
of Evidence seems inconsequential and fully in keeping with the goal
of ensuring that military evidentiary law remains as similar to civilian
evidentiary law as possible. At the same time, adoption of a presumption rule applicable to criminal cases might have been of value to
judges and counsel.

B. PLEAS, PLEA BARGAINING, AND
OATHS DURING PROVIDENCY
The Working Group had no problem adopting Federal Rule of
Evidence 410, which protected the plea bargaining process. The
drafters were concerned with the unique nature of the military procedure that permits an attempt to resign ''for the good of the service'' and expanded the rule to protect against statements submitted as part of such an attempt. 58
There was debate as to whether an accused pleading guilty should
be examined under oath during the providency inquiry. Commander
Pinnell argued strenuously that the oath requirement was necessary
to protect the integrity of the plea and to avoid pretrial agreements
by innocent accused. I maintained that an innocent accused willing
to plead guilty to obtain a plea bargain was not likely to be deterred
from doing so by the oath, which simply would add to the coercive
nature of the criminal justice system. In its original form, Rule 410
was promulgated without a requirement that the providency inquiry
be conducted under oath. That requirement, however, was added
as part of the Rules for Courts-Martial. 59

C. THE RAPE SHIELD RULE;

FRESH COMPLAINT
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 presented special problems. Under
military law as it then existed, evidence of lack of chastity of a rape
victim or of sexual relations outside marriage was admissible for impeachment and to establish consent. It was apparent that the usual
form of this evidence was irrelevant, psychologically damaging to
58The drafters were concerned with formal procedures that required a confessional
request for an administrative discharge. We did not discuss, nor did we intend to reach,
the type of conduct that the Court of Military Appeals subsequently has protected
via Rule 410. See, e.g., United States v. Brabant, 29 M.J. 259, 263-64 (C.M.A. 1989);
United States v. Barunas, 23 M.J. 71 (C.M.A. 1986).
~ 9R.C.M. 910 (e). Commander Pinnell had declared his intent to adopt the oath requirement at the first opportunity. The change illustrates the importance of the individuals assigned to drafting duty.
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many complainants, and often was given unwarranted value by fact!mders. The question was, however, what to do about the situation.
Given its attempt to limit sharply evidence relating to a victim's
past sexual history, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 seemed an unduly
complex rule with significant constitutional difficulties. The rule
itself is an unusual one. Outside of the District of Columbia, limited
federal criminal jurisdiction provides that most rape cases are tried
in state courts. Viewed objectively and without concern for individual
bias or political implications, 60 Rule 412 was unnecessary. Basic principles of logical relevance coupled with Federal Rule of Evidence 403
should have been sufficient, and a proposal was made not to adopt
Rule 412 in favor of a more general statement of the application of
the principle of relevancy. Ms. Siemer, DOD General Counsel, rejected
that position, and the Working Group adopted Rule 412.
Having decided (or directed) to adopt the federal rape shield rule,
the Working Group was left with several important details. The Group
quickly deleted the civilian rule's requirement that the proponent
of evidence covered by the rule give I1.fteen days notice of proffer
because it might unnecessarily delay trials. More important, the
Working Group considered Rule 412 to be both too limited and too
expansive. It was too limited because of its focus only on rape, and
accordingly, the Group expanded Military Rule of Evidence 412 to
include other offenses such as sodomy. 61
It was, however, also too expansive in its provision that evidence

of past reputation or opinion of the character of a victim be per se
inadmissible. One can create hypotheticals in which such evidence,
offered by the defense, would be constitutionally necessary for a fair
trial. Under normal circumstances, the constitutional guarantees
would supersede an evidentiary rule, and the evidence would be admitted. Rule 412 is a highly unusual rule, however, and a different

0f course, Rule 412 was an important symbol for thest' very reasons, and it was
evident that, given past military law, it was essential that some form of dear break
with the past be demonstrated.
61At Colonel Alley's request, the Army proposed an additional scctton that would
have admitted "past sexual behavior as a prostitute" if there were other evidence
of consent, evidence that the alleged sexual act was performed by tlte \'ictim for pay·
ment, and evidence that "the complaint of the nonconsensual se.'\*Ual offeJlS(.> was made
by the victim as a result of subsequent dispute concerning payment for the sexual
act." Colonel Alley had found that the Army in Europe had a number of C'ruiCS in which
prostitutes had alleged rape following disagreement on tlte proper remwteration. Tite
additional section would have clarified Rule 412's application to this situation. Thl'
other services, however, unanimously rejected it. Post Joint Scn·it-e Committee sum·
mary suBmitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979).
60
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result can apply. The rule provides that if its procedural requirements
are met, otherwise barred evidence, other than opinion or reputation evidence, may be admitted when constitutionally required. 62 The
plain meaning of the rule is that reputation or opinion evidence is
never admissible. Accordingly, the defense is estopped from using
it, and if a fair trial demands its use, the only remedy is to abate
the trial or to dismiss the charges. This somewhat abnormal situation makes perfect sense considering the legislative history of Federal
Rule of Evidence 412, which includes concern that complainants not
be psychologically il\iured by improper cross-examination. Although
the Working Group believed that concern to be substantial, it felt
that dismissal of charges would not be in the best interests of society or the complainant, and the Group preferred to remove the absolute language from Rule 412(a). The Working Group's sole female
member strongly objected, and the Navy concurred in her objection.
As a result, we decided to place our intent in the Analysis rather
than the rule. 63
A collateral consequence of the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was the elimination of the specific Manual declaration of
admissibility of evidence of fresh complaint. Considering the number
of sex offenses that occur in the armed forces, members of the Working Group preferred to codify "fresh complaint"-which in the
military had been broad enough to include the identity of the offender64-and to preserve it in the military rules. The military members
of the Joint Service Committee65 unanimously approved the policy
decision, and we drafted proposed Rule 412A, Fresh Complaint Concerning a Sexual Offense. Ms. Siemer overruled the attempt to retain fresh complaint evidence. 66 Accordingly, the present rules per62See,

e.g., United States v. Perry, 14 M.J. 856 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
Accordingly, we attempted for political reasons to preserve our intent via the
"legislative history" rather than modifying the rule itself.
64 MCM, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 142c.
65 Voting Sheet, Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (30 May 1979) (policy
decision). The Court Representative objected to inclusion of the proposed Rule 412A
on the grounds that it was not within the Federal Rules of Evidence and that fresh
complaint evidence was not probative. Post Joint Service Committee summary submitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979).
66 During final coordination, the Army responded officially: "The Rules omit any
explicit reference to fresh complaint. Specific recognition of this exception to the hearsay rule should be included in the Rules. The omission of a specific fresh complaint
is of significant concern to the Department of the Army." Memorandum for General
Counsel Department of Defense (Attn: Director, Legislative Reference Service) Proposed Executive Order "Prescribing Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1969 (Revised Edition)" (5 Aug. 1979). In a memorandum directly to
the DOD General Counsel, General Clausen wrote:
Recommend Rule 412A (Fresh Complaint) be restored. The omission of the topic
from the Federal Rules reflects only the minimal number of cases involving sexual assaults in the Article III courts and is apparently an ov('rsight. Its omis63
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mit fresh complaint evidence on the merits only when admissible
under Rule 80l(d)(l)(B) as a prior consistent statement when the complainant is alleged to have fabricated his or her testimony or when
admissible as an ''excited utterance' ' 67 or other hearsay exception. 68

D. BIAS IMPEACHMENT
The Federal Rules of Evidence failed to codify bias impeachment.
In one sense, this was eminently reasonable given the impeachment
structure of those rules. Because the basic impeachment rule is one
of logical relevance under Rules 401 and 402, the drafters codified
only those areas that departed from the concept-most notably those
rules that limited admissibility. It seemed clear to me that although
the federal approach might be analytically sound, it might prove
highly troublesome in military practice. The Manual for CourtsMartial not only had a bias impeachment rule, but also expressly permitted the use of extrinsic evidence. Absent a similar provision in
the Military Rules of Evidence, litigation over this essential fonn of
impeachment was probable. Accordingly, bias was codified as Rule
608(c), a national model. 69

sion from the Military Rules will result in the exclusion of e\·idence of fresh
complaint in all but those few cases which would come within tlte very Umited
relevant exceptions to the hearsay rule. Evidence of fresh complaint, or lack
thereof, is probative and valuable. Considering the unfortunately large number
of se>...-ual assault cases common to the armed forces, the rule is clearly needed.
Evidence of fresh complaint does not involve any of tlte detrimental factors
that led to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and there appeaci to be no socjaJ or
political justification for its omission.
Memorandum, MG Clausen, Army Acting TJAG, for General C{)unsel, DOD, 23 July
1979, subject: DOD Draft of the Military Rules of Evidence (14 Aug. 1979). The Air
Force agreed with this position, stating:
Although there is no comparable rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Air
Force strongly recommends the inclusion of 412A in the military rules. Apparent·
ly, it was not included in the Federal Rules due to oversight or a general belief
that the infrequent trial of sa-ual offenses in Federal C{)urts negated its necessi·
ty. Most states have adopted some concept of the ••fresh complaint·· doctrine.
and the Code Committee approved the insertion of this rule in tltc military rules.
Memorandum for General Counsel Department of Defense (ATTN: Director, Legislative
Reference Service) DID E.O. Doc. 241, Proposed Executive Order "Prescribing Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Re;\·ised Edition)" (AFU
4664) (30 Aug. 1979).
67See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 14 M.J. 845 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
68Somewhat ironically, despite my enthusiasm for a fresh complaint rule during draft·
ing, I have concluded that fresh complaint is neither justified nor necessary. It is hnrd
to defend the doctrine when declaring as irrelevant a "fresh complaint" of a nonsex·
ual offense, such as robbery.
69Interestingly, despite general acceptance in the federal district courts, the ques·
tion of whether bias was permitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence had to be
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1984. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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E. THE HEARSAY RULELABORATORY REPORTS
Drug prosecutions were (and are) a m~or component of military
criminal legal practice. At the time the Military Rules of Evidence
were written, a fair degree of litigation time had been devoted to
the admissibility of forensic laboratory reports in courts-martial.
Given the confrontation clause, there was strong reason to doubt that
these records had the type of reliability that justified their admission. As a practical matter, however, the abolition of these reports
was considered unacceptable by the services, and express exceptions
for laboratory reports and chains of custody were incorporated into
Rules 803(6) and (8) along with a list of othenvise acceptable
documents then listed as hearsay exceptions in the Manual. 70

F. THE HEARSAY RULE-

ARTICLE 82 TESTIMONY
Although the Military Rules of Evidence contain several drafting
errors, 71 the provision for use of prior article 32 testimony is one of
the worst. 72 Under the 1969 Manual, article 32 investigation testimony could be offered at trial by court-martial if the declarant was
unavailable and the prior testimony had been under oath, subject
to cross-examination, and recorded on a verbatim record. Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), however, provides that a hearsay exception exists for testimony of an unavailable declarant when it is:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if
the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
I drafted the laboratory exceptions at the direction of Colonel Clause. See b-upra
note 47. I added the exception for chain of custody documents for reasons of con·
sistency and because I believed that they were in fact proper business records. A lit·
tle noticed aspect of chain of custody forms is, however, that they usually do not provide space for reports of the condition of the material being transferred and thus ure
not relevant on the issue of condition or contamination. The court representative op·
posed the changes on the grounds that they were not in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and inadequate military necessity existed for them. Post Joint Service Committee sum·
mary submitted to Colonel Wayne Hansen (July 1979).
71
See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 3U(g)(2). In adopting Franks v. Delaware, 422 U.S. 928 (1978),
the rule refers to "the allegation of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." The
rule should have used "perjury" or "intentional misstatement" instead of "falsity."
72 I drafted it.
70
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The focus of the federal rule is on the motivation of the declarant
at the earlier proceeding. The 1969 Manual provision did not include
motive. \Vhen drafted, Military Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) attempted to adopt the federal rule while retaining the original Manual rule
for military proceedings, including article 32 investigations.
Thstimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or different proceeding or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if
the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination. A record of testimony
given before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, other military tribunals, and before proceedings pursuant
to or equivalent to those required by Article 32 is admissible
under this subdivision if such a record is a verbatim record. . ..
The text of the rule technically was sufficient because the second
sentence set forth a special and distinct rule for military proceedings.
Notwithstanding this, some could argue that it is unclear from the
text whether the second sentence, dealing with unique military proceedings, stands alone or is governed by the similar motive rule in
the rrrst sentence.
The exception was one of the few rules to be discussed at length
by the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. The Marine
representative questioned the way the military provision had been
grafted onto the basic civilian rule. Distracted by other business, I
failed to recognize fully the implications of the ta't, and I convinced
the Committee to rely on the Analysis. 73 This was done badly by any
73! subsequently reported:

The Marine Corps has objected to one aspect of Rule 804 . . . . Subdivision (b)(1)
[Former Thstimony] was modified in committee to make testimony given at
courts-martial, Article 32 proceedings, or their equivalents admissible when
a verbatim record is made of the proceedings. This language was a result of
the requirement in the Federal Rule that the party against whom the testimony
is being offered have had a "similar motive" at the first proceeding to develop
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. The Committee is unanimous
(with the probable exception of the Court Representative) that Article 32
testimony et al. should be admissible as former testimony pur.mant to the
modification. The difficulty lies in the draftsmanship. It is presumed that the
Marine Corps would support specific language in the Rule making it clear that
the "similar motive" language is not relevant, but the Court would probably
object. The Navy is willing to resolve the issue via the Analysis but the Marines
may object. Either solution should be acceptable to us. The problem is complicated by the USCMA recognition that Article 32's were intended to be
discovery devices by Congress. Hence, there is a valid argument that specific
language in the Rule would be inappropriate. Present law, however, allows use
of Article 32 testimony as former testimony when a verbatim record has been
made.
Post Joint Service Committee summary submitted to C.olonel Wayne Ha.nscn (July 1979).
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standard. It became fatal, however, when the issue was sent to the
Code Committee for resolution, and the Code Committee determined that, without amending the rule, it wished both sentences to be
read together, thus requiring proof of similar motive and a verbatim
record for article 32 and similar hearings. 74 The Analysis reflects the
Code Committee's intent in that regard: ''The Rule is explicitly intended to prohibit use of testimony at an Article 32 hearing unless
the requisite similar motive was present during the hearing.' ' 76 The
final irony occurred when the Court of Military Appeals decided the
question of how to interpret the rule, the judges having participated
in the decision that merged the two provisions into one. Having
previously decided that discovery was not ''a prime object of the
pretrial investigation,'' 76 in UnitedStatesv. Conner11 Judges Everett
and Cox dispensed with the Analysis and held:
[A]s we interpret the requirement of 'similar motive,' if the
defense counsel has been allowed to cross-examine the government witness without restriction on the scope of crossexamination, then the provisions of Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) and
of the Sixth Amendment are satisfied even if that opportunity
is not used, and the testimony can later be admitted at trial. 78
As a consequence, the court accepted the similar motive test and
then gutted it by rendering it meaningless. 79 All this could have been
avoided by a minor redraft of the rule.

G. PRIVILEGES
Given the Working Group's mandate to adopt the Federal Rules of
Evidence to the extent practicable, the drafters were limited in their
creativity. Because the Federal Rules of Evidence lack specific
privilege rules, however, the normal limitation did not apply to
codification of privileges. The military privilege rules were taken in
part from the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial and the proposed but
unenacted Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with privileges, and
were written partially from scratch.
74From an academic standpoint, the Code Committee's decision was eminently
reasonable, and, I now think, correct. The failure to modify Rule 804(b)(l) to expressly state the Code Committee's intent, however, was a major error that led first to un necessary confusion and litigation and then to its nullification.
7
~Mil. R. Evid. 804 analysis at A22-51.
76
United States v. Arruza, 26 M.J. 234 (C.M.A. 1988) (citing United States v. Eggers,
11 C.M.R. 191, 194 (1953)) (emphasis added).
77
27 M.J. 378, 387-90 (C.M.A. 1989).
78 /d. at 389.
79Concurring in the result, Judge Sullivan wrote of "the majority opinion's eviscera·
tion of Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(I)." /d. at 392.
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Andy Effron drafted the privilege rules. Although all the privilege
rules were done well, his genius shines through in Military Rule of
Evidence 501. A hybrid masterpiece,80 the rule provides both for
codified individual privileges and for those privileges ·'generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts." As a result, military law has a body of specific privileges
and may adopt other new privileges that are accepted by the federal
district courts. Codification of privileges is inherently difficult given
the major policy questions and the fear of preventing growth in the
law to adjust to new situations. Military Rule of Evidence 501 is an
ideal compromise between total, rigid, codification and abandonment
of the effort in favor of a case law approach.
Space prohibits a detailed review of the privilege rules, but it may
suffice to note that the codification is one of the most completeK1
and useful in the nation. 82

H. 1'HE CONSTITUTIONAL CODIFICATION
IN GENERAL
The Section mrules are unique in the United States and are a compromise between the military's need for ftxed rules with stability and
certainty and the lawyer's desire for case-by-case adjudication and
change. They are binding because they either accurately codify existing constitutional case law or are more favorable to the accused
than case law prescribes. Except insofar as individual provisions intentionally leave matters "free to float" with case law, they were
intended to be absolutely binding on all personnel and were to be
altered solely by amendment.83
\Vhen drafting the search and seizure and interrogation rules.""* I
attempted to use the following guidelines:

80\Vhich the ABA Section on Criminal Justice Committee on Hull'S of EvtdL•nce and
Criminal Procedure has adopted as a preferred alternative to tlte presenl Federal rule.
s•And arguably one of the best.
82
S~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 505, Classified Information. One of Ute most untbual provt·
sions found in the rules is Mil. R. 5ll(b), which I believe I drafted intually Titat rule
provides in part that the transmission of otherwise privileged infommtion by telephonl'
remains privileged even if overheard in a predictable fashion. lntendl'<l to n-cogmze
modem life. particularly in the armed forces witlt communications morutonng. the
rule is a unique recognition of social changes due to tl'<'hnology.
83But see infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussingjudictal abrogatton and
indifference).
84Mr. Effron drafted the eyewitness identification rules and collabomtl'd on ~hi. R.
Evid. 313(b), Inspections.
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1. Procedural rules should be binding and should be spelled out
in detail. 85
2. Areas of the law that are of importance only to lawyers ordinarily should be left to case law development. 86
3. Areas of law that are of importance to nonlawyers should be
codified in a binding fashion and should be spelled out in
detail. 87 Change should be through amendment of the rules.
4.

If the answer to a legal question is unclear and we are unable
to resolve it by policy decision, no answer should be codified; 88
applicable Supreme Court language should be used, however
unclear; 89 or, as complete an answer as is accurate should be
given, with the remainder of the question left to case law. 00

5.

When desirable, room should be left for unanticipated major
changes in the law. 01

Although one could disagree with any given provision, one would
have thought that taken as a whole the structure would have addressed adequately all legitimate concerns about ''over codification,''
limiting the development of the law, or supplying "inadequate
guidance to the field.'' That it did not92 for many critics may be more
of a comment on the common law orientation of American lawyers,
or on the hubris of judges, than an indication of inadequacy.

I. INTERROGATIONS-NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Within the Working Group one of the more controversial provisions
was the notice to counsel rule-Military Rule of Evidence
85

Se~
Se~

e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 301, 311.
e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 31l(a)(2) ("the accused would otherwise have grounds to
object to the search or seizure under the Constitution"); Mil. R. Evid. 3ll(c)(l) (a search
or seizure is unlawful if "in violation of the Constitution of the United States as ap·
plied to members of the armed forces").
s1See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314.
sssee, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 305(c).
89
Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 301(d) ("except when there is a real danger of further self·
incrimination"); Mil. R. Evid. 314(f)(1) ("criminal activity may be afoot").
90
Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 305(0 ("if a person chooses to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination or the right to counsel under this rule, questioning must cease lm·
mediately"). At the time this was written, the impact of asserting the right to couns<•l
was unclear. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675 {1988), came later. The rule specified what was known-that interrogation
had to stop, but left open and to case law the question of resumption.
91
Se~ e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 314(k) (other searches).
92See infra text accompanying notes 118-44.
86
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305(e)93-which implemented the decision of the Court of Military
Appeals in United States v. .AfcOmbe?-94 in an effort to ensure that
interrogators did not nullify a represented suspect's right to counsel.
The Navy representative strongly opposed the rule and forecast dire
consequences if it were adopted, 95 while the Air Force attempted
to limit its reach.96 The rule was adopted and, contrary to the expressed fears, apparently has proven neither unworkable nor controversial. 97

J. SEARCH AND SEIZURE-BODILY VIEWS
AND INSPECTIONS 9s
When originally drafted, Military Rule of Evidence 312 dealt
primarily with strip and intrusive body searches. As such, it was to
the best of my knowledge the first binding rule of its type in the nation and, insofar as that aspect is concerned, it has held up quite
well. Neither Rule 312 nor Rule 313(b), Inspections, however, dealt
adequately with urinalysis-primarily because they were not intended to do so.
When the rule was drafted, the services' general policy was to
locate drug abusers and either treat them or discharge them using
a medical justification. Military Rule of Evidence 312(0. Intrusions
for Medical Diagnosis, was an ''open sesame'' designed to permit
urinalysis or other procedures for valid medical reasons. 99 When lrrst
the Navy and then the other services abandoned in whole or in part
the medical justification for urinalysis,100 the Rule 312(0 "escape
clause" lost its utility.
93"\Vhen a person subject to the Code who is required to give wamin8,!> under subdivision (c) intends to question an accused or person suspected of an offense and know:.
or reasonably should know that counsel either has been appointed for or retained
by the accused or suspect with respect to that offense, Lhl' cout\Sl'l must be noufied
of the intended interrogation and given a reasonabh.• timl' in whadt to anend before
the interrogation may proceed:·
941 M.J. 380 (C. .M.A. 1976).
95As well as promising repeal at the earliest possible moment.
96'fhe Air Force wished to eliminate that part of the notkl' requarement that applied when the interrogator "reasonably should know·· that counsel had been obtained. Memorandum for General Counsel Department of Dl'fense (Ann: Dln'Ctor,
Legislative Reference Service) DID E.O. Doc. 241. Proposed Exl'<.'utivl' Ordl'r "Prescnbing Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (HevlS{>d Eda·
tion)" (AFLI 4664) 2 (30 Aug. 1979).
97At the same time, the rule has bolstered the protection afforded military J>(.'P>On ·
nel from the type of implicit coercion potentially found in the military em·tronml'nt.
98Now amended to read "Body vie\\'S and intrusions." Sec i7t(ra text accompanytng
notes 122-25.
99See .Mil. R. Evid. 312(0 analysis of A22-19.
1oosee, e.g., Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 77 (C.M.A. 1983) (eating "Tltl' l'arlucca
Memorandum," a December 28, 1981, DOD memorandum issued by Ik>puty Secretary
of Defense Carlucci allowing •'evidence obtained by compulsory urinalyslS to lx> used
for disciplinary action").
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Inherent in this discussion is the assumption that Military Rule of
Evidence 312 was intended to apply to urinalysis and forcible extraction of bodily fluids. When the rule was revised concurrently with
the promulgation of the Rules for Courts-Martial, however, Military
Rule of Evidence 312( d)'s title was changed from "Seizure of Bodily
Fluids" to "Extraction of Body Fluids." The change in title was needed because the subsection "does not apply to compulsory production of body fluids (e.g., being ordered to void urine), but rather to
physical extraction of body fluids (e.g., catheterization or withdrawal
of blood)," 101 an analysis concurred in by the Court of Military Appeals.102 This was erroneous; the rule always was intended to apply
to urinalysis outside the scope of the medical exception in Rule 312(0.
That is why the section was entitled ''seizure.'' That the rule was
not drafted well for this purpose, however, is apparent.l 03

K. SEARCH AND SEIZURE-INSPECTIONS
Arguably, the most important aspect of the "constitutional"
codification was Rule 313(b), Inspections. It is the only rule expressly issued by the President using his authority as Commander in
Chief!04 Unlike the other rules, it is the only rule intended to regulate
directly day-to-day nonlaw enforcement activities of the armed
forces.

To be understood, Rule 313(b) must be placed in context. When
the drafting project began, it did so against the backdrop of a major
worldwide drug abuse problem and an activist Court of Military Appeals without a unified theory of inspections,105 a court that was
hostile to prosecutions based on inspections for drugs. Judge Perry
in particular viewed drug possession and sale as ''evidence of
crime'' 106 and could not accept an inspection for drugs as a proper
administrative inspection.107 His view seemed mistaken as drug use
rendered successful military operations impossible; drugs-like
unlawful weapons-seemed a fundamental aspect of the health,
welfare, and operational readiness of the armed forces. The eourt 's
Mil. R. Evid. 312 analysis at A22-19.
Murray, 16 M.J. at 77.
103 As a consequence Mil. R. Evid. :31:J(b) was subsequently amended to stat<• that,
"(a]n order to produce body fluids, such as urine, is permissible in accordam'(' with
this Rule." Although this resolves the urinalysis "inspection" issue, it leaves op('n an
order to produce urine incident to a probable cause seizure.
104 Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20.
105See, e.g. , United States v. Thomas, 1 M.J. 397 (C.M.A. 1976).
106 United States v. Roberts, 2 M..J. 31, 36 (C.M.A. 1976).
107'fhe court changed its perspective in United States v. Middleton, 10 M..J. 12!3 (C.M .A.
1981).
101

102
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holdings, therefore, seriously threatened readiness. At the same time,
we had the perception that some commanders were perjuring
themselves during suppression motions by testifying that they were
conducting traditional "health and welfare" inspections when they
were really looking for drugs. Such conduct was clearly horrendous
and unacceptable.
Accordingly, Rule 313(b) was drafted to realign the concept of
"health and welfare inspections," 108 and it stated e.xplicitly that "(a]n
inspection also includes an examination to locate and confiscate
unlawful weapons and other contraband when such property would
affect adversely the security, military fitness, or good order and
discipline of the command." The rule assumed, for example, that
there was some form of reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
belongings in a barracks,109 but that the military's interest in
readiness, as well as the individual's interest in a secure and safe
environment, justified inspection for drugs when that inspection was
not intended as a subterfuge for a search of an individual. When
viewed against the backdrop of the drug problem, Rule 313(b) had
enormous consequence and potentially permitted near carte blanche authority to inspect in some badly troubled commands. That
result seemed fully appropriate when the usually minimal e.xpectation of privacy was viewed against the administrative need.
Rule 313(b) subsequently was amended. Among other changes, using the decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States
v. Middleton,no the drafters deleted the requirement for "a case-bycase showing of the adverse effects of weapons or contraband (including controlled substances) in the particular unit, organization,
installation, aircraft, or vehicle exarnined." 111 The rule thus assumes
that drugs (included within the definition of contraband) are sufficiently adverse to military readiness and the like to permit administrative inspections. It shifts the primary focus to prohibiting
subterfuge searches intended for prosecutorial purposes. The drafters
of the amendments acted in an appellate legal environment far more
favorable to inspections for drugs than we did.
Contemporary civilian case law112 suggests that even the present
tollSee generally Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20-A22-24.
09"fhe rule, however, also applied to all other locations including on post quart~r.>.
11010 M.J. 123 (C.M.A. 1981) (Middleton was not based, however. on Rule 313(b)).
1

See Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-23.
S~ e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 15 li.S.L.\\'. 4781 (U.S. Jun~ 14,
1990); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Skin·
ner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Cf. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987); New .Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (198S).
111

112
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Rule 313(b) may be more conservative than needed. The rule retains
the distinction between an administrative inspection and an examination intended to locate evidence for prosecutorial purposes. Major
Pat Lisowski113 has suggested that many commanders would testify,
if they could, that they see little distinction for readiness purposes
between inspecting for drugs to rid the unit of them114 and looking
for offenders to prosecute to deter others. In civilian life, the war
against drugs poses agonizing choices between personal privacy and
liberty on the one hand, and our strong desire to eliminate drug trafficking and use on the other. Presumably, however, the fourth amendment provides some basic reservoir of privacy for civilians that cannot be altered despite public desire. It is by no means clear that the
fourth amendment need function similarly in the armed forces.
When Rule 313(b) initially was drafted, it was apparent that there
was a reasonable legal argument that inspections were simply not
''searches'' within the scope of the fourth amendment. The Analysis
states in part: "Consequently, although the fourth amendment is applicable to members of the Armed Forces, inspections may not be
'searches' within the meaning of the fourth amendment by reason
of history, necessity, and constitutional interpretation." 115 Although
I find it troubling, at least in its attempted application to civilian life,
I believe that the doctrine of original intent readily could be used
to remove all military inspections-whatever their intent-from
fourth amendment regulation.1 16 This would permit inspections with
prosecutorial purposes, although arguably it would prohibit a subterfuge inspection intended solely to obtain evidence against a single
individual.
Although it may be that reappraisal of the application of the fourth
amendment to military inspections117 would yield significantly greater
command freedom-freedom sustainable by the United States
Supreme Court-it is not clear that increasing command flexibility
in this manner is desirable as a policy matter. Implementation of such

The outgoing search and seizure expert from the Criminal Law Division of The
Judge Advocate General's School.
114
0r to forestall their appearance.
w>Mil. R. Evid. 313(b) analysis at A22-20.
116The same result might follow from an assumption that there is a de minimis ex·
pectation of privacy throughout the armed forces. I think, however, that various
reasonable expectations do in fact exist and would hesitate to rewrite Rule 313(b) on
that basis.
117Because of the structure of the Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 313(b) would have
to first be amended before such a change could be effective. Of course, the Court of
Military Appeals first could endorse such an approach in dictum.
113
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a change might send a signal to personnel at all levels that might
significantly impair morale and thus might entail an unreasonable
socio-political cost.

Vll. THE RULES IN ACTIONJUDICIAL RESISTANCE
In a common law system based on precedent, a new statute
presents a new starting point. Unless the constitutionality of the
statute is called into question, the statute is valid and must be applied. As cases are presented to the courts, the courts interpret the
statute and, through case law precedent, often alter the statute's
meaning in the process. Certainly, the court may interpret the text
in a fashion inconsistent with its historical intent.l 18 Should the
legislative authorities disagree with the judicial interpretation, they
are free to revise the statute and reinitiate the process of interpretation. This description of the common law process is known to and
is accepted by all Anglo-American lawyers and often is taken for
granted by them. It is thus the same process that we expected to

11BThe Court of Military Appeals has done this, for e:~arnplc, in the area of character
evidence. Like its federal counterpart, Military Rule of Evidence 404(a){l) pcnnit.s
the accused to offer on the merits "evidence of a pertinent trait of the character of
the accused." The analysis to the rule states, "It is the intention of the c~mmittce,
however, to allow the defense to introduce evidence of good military character when
that specific trait is pertinent. Evidence of good military character would be admissi·
ble, for example, in a prosecution for disobedience of orders." Mil. R. Evid. 404 analysis
at A22-32. Interpreting the rule, however, the court has gone well beyond the limited
use intended by the drafters. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 28 M.J. 48,49 n.l (C.M.A.
1989). See generally Smith, Military Rule ofE1.'idi?11Cl' 4(}!j(a)(J): An Urt.Sltcci'S.'i[ul .4l·
tempt to Limit the Introduction of Character Evide11ce on t11e Merits, 33 Fed. B. News
& J. 429 (1986) ("An analysis of these cases leads to a conclusion that the drafter.>'
intent behind Mil. R. Evid. 404(aXl) to limit the nature of admissible character evidence
has been all but ignored-and that the interests of justice have been better served
as a result") Id. at 430.
Clearly the text of a rule is the primary source of law. In one of my fir.>t cases as
a military judge after drafting the rules, I was faced with an eyewitness idcnUfica·
tion suppression motion brought under Rule 321. After argument by counsel, I fell
constrained to apply the rule as explicitly written even though its analysis suggested
a different outcome. Although I think it proper to consult legislative history to inter·
pret a statute or rule, if the .. plain meaning" is susceptible of only one intcrpreta·
tion, I believe that interpretation to be binding.
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apply once the Military Rules of Evidence were promulgated.tw We
did not expect the degree of judicial resistance that took place.' 20
Although most courts in the armed forces, at all levels, have applied the rules routinely and have dealt with them as one would expect, that has not always been the case. The actions of the Court
of Military Appeals have been particularly disturbing given its role
as the "Supreme Court of the Armed Forces." The court has shown
a surprising and alarming willingness to ignore and twist the rules,121
especially the "constitutional" rules.
Although trivial, one of the earliest harbingers of the court's attitude may be United States v. Armstrong.122 A pre-rules case, Annstrong examined the application of the article 31 right against selfincrimination to a blood test of a suspected drunk driver convicted
of involuntary manslaughter. In discussing article 3l(b), Chief Judge
Everett referred to "body fluids" 123 and then, via a lengthy explanatory footnote,l 24 stated: "Although Mil. R. Evid. 312(d) uses the
term 'bodily fluids,' we choose to employ the words 'body fluids,'
. . . . '' Although strictly speaking, the court did not use its own terminology in lieu of the rule's,125 it signaled its willingness to substitute
its own preferences for those promulgated by the President.
119
lt may be that United States v. Alleyne, 13 M.J. 331 (C.M.A. 1982), is an illustrntive
case. Faced with the refusal of a soldier to permit an exit examination of personal
property when he was leaving a United States installation in Korea, the property WllS
seized and searched yielding evidence of theft. After deciding that civilian case law
permitted exit customs searches, the court briefly referred to Mil. R. Evid. 314(c) and,
noting that the rule,
seems to limit overseas gate searches to occasions of entry. Since such
a distinction would be at odds with the rationale for border searches and
with the precedents on the subject-and since the Rule docs not purport specifically to preclude the exit search-we are unwilling in this instance to fmd a negative implication in the authority granted by the Rule
to make entry searches.
13 M.J. at 335. One could argue that if the search were not authorized by Rule 314
in some particular, including the 314(k) new type of search "escape clause," it would
be unlawful. One could read the court's opinion, however, as interpreting Rule 314(c)
implicitly to permit exit searches through poor drafting. Although I know this to be
erroneous given my knowledge of the original intent of the provision (which considen•d
the interests in protecting against improper entry of property to be different from
those associated with exits), it is the type of thing one might expect an American
court to do within the scope of the "game" of statutory interpretation.
12
°Concededly, the rules are not statutes themselves but they were promulgated by
the President under both statutory authority, UCMJ art. 36, and his inherent authority
as Commander in Chief; thus, they have the force of law.
121
At least "twisting" rules is sometimes part of the "interpretation game." Ignoring rules is an entirely different matter.
1229 M.J. 374 (1980).
123
Jd. at 378.
t24Jd. n.5.
125
Rule 312 subsequently was amended to use "body" fluids, and the court's first
review of the rule properly addressed the new, and preferred, terminology.
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Far more worrisome was the court's statement in J'tllllTay v.

Haldeman: 126 "However, it is not necessary-or even profitable-to

try to fit compulsory urinalysis within the specific terms of that rule.
We have made clear that a search may be reasonable even though
it does not fit neatly into a category specifically authorized by a
Military Rule of Evidence.'' 127 This was error. Military Rule of
Evidence 314(k) recognizes new types of searches approved via case
law; it is quite clearly not a "near miss" rule. As the court is bound
by the rules, either a search is authorized by them or it is unlawfulunless it is a new type under Rule 314(k).
Having set the stage, the court then proceeded to an unprecedented form of judicial sleight of hand in United Slates v. Tipton.128 Tipton involved the reliability of an informant who supplied
information that ultimately resulted in the apprehension of the accused. The unanimous court discussed and applied the Supreme
Court's Illinois v. Gates129 decision, which abrogated the
Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong130 test for probable cause to search. The
court did this notwithstanding the fact that Aguilm1Spinelli was
written into Military Rules of Evidence 315(f)(2) and 316(d).l31 Amazingly, the Tipton opinion fails even to cite the Military Rules of Evidence. The court had no problem, however, discussing Rule :31:3(c),
Inventory, in United States v. Dulus,132 a case decided less than one
month after Tipton. In Dulus the court used, and perhaps "stretched," the rule to justify an "inventory" search of an airman's
automobile after his apprehension and confmement.
The Court of Military Appeals was not the only offender during
this period. In 1982, the Air Force Court of Military Review, discussing Rule 614(b)'s requirement that questions of a witness by court
members be submitted in writing, referred to "the procedure suggested'' by the rule and disparaged itP3

126!6 .M.J. 74 (C..M.A . 1983).

Jd. at 82. The opinion continues:
Compulsory urinalysis under the circumstances of thl' preSl'nt case is jusufied
by the same considerations that pennit health and welfare inspections.
Therefore, we conclude that the draftsmen of thl' Rull's did not tntl'nd to in·
validate that procedure sub silentio by their failure to authorire it spcctfirnlly.
Indeed, Mil. R. Evid. 314(k) makes this very point
. /d.
12816 M.J. 283 (C.M.A. 1983).

127

129462 u.s. 213 (1983).
130'fhe two prongs of this test are 1) reliability and 2) basis in fact.
131Compare Tipton with United Statl's v. Bollerud, 16 M.J. 761 (A .C.~t.R. 19s:J)

(holding that the Military Rules preempted applirntion of Gat~·s) .
13216 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1983).
133 United States v. Miller, 14 M.J. 924, 926 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (emphasiS added).
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In 1984, Chief Judge Everett invited me to address the annual
Homer Ferguson Conference on the topic of the Military Rules of
Evidence. I spokel 34 on rules compliance and quite bluntly asserted
that Tipton in particular compelled the conclusion that the Court
of Military Appeals was either incompetent or lawless. In fact, incompetence was impossible, at least in the sense of ignorance of the
rule's existence. After all, one of the drafters of the rules, Mr. Robert
Mueller, a highly competent and responsible lawyer, had represented
the court during drafting and was still at the court. What the court
actually had done was to disregard the rules and thereby set itself
above the President's statutory authority-and it had done so without
the minimum judicial candor expected from a court when it feels
it is right and proper to deviate from an apparently applicable statute
or regulation.
Following Tipton, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review
directly addressed the binding nature of the rules. In United States
v. Postle' 35 the court, in dicta, discussed the potential application to
the military of the ''good faith exception'' enunciated in United States
v. Leon.l36 Having first conceded that the text of the Military Rules
of Evidence excluded that exception and that "to conclude otherwise is to open a court to attack on the ground that its interpretation of the law is nothing more than judicial legislation-an exercise
of power which we believe to be the antithesis of that granted courts
created under Article I of the United States Constitution . .. [,]" 137
the court handily found that the "Constitution is a fluid and dynamic
law'' and that the
drafters, well aware of this flexibility in the Constitution-and
the unpredictable vagaries of its interpretation-must have intended that rules of evidence enacted to incorporate the then
extant constitutional principles on the subjects addressed be
interpreted with equal flexibility. These "constitutional rules"
... were intended to keep pace with, and apply to the military,
the burgeoning body of interpretative constitutional law ...
not to cast in legal evidentiary concrete the Constitution as it
was known in 1980.138

134\Vith his prior knowledge and consent.
13520 M.J. 632 (N.M.C.R. 1985).
136468 U.S. 897 {1984).
131Pr:JstiR, 20 M.J. at 643.
138Jd.
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That this attractive and facile statement clearly is wrong is im·
mediately evident from a review of the text of the rules,13 fJ the
Analysis, and the post-promulgation history of the rules.
The rules were written in large measure to supply certai1lty and
predictability to this critical area of military law. Given the
worldwide dispersion of the armed forces, the comparative lack of
legal advice, and the need for consistent procedures throughout the
armed forces, the drafters-and the President-intentionally set
much of the Military Rules of Evidence in "concrete." 140 The assump·
tion was that as desirable or binding changes occurred in the con·
stitutional case law enunciated by the Supreme Court, the Military
Rules would be amended.1 41 This already had happened when the
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review decided Postle; actually, the court referred to the amendment of the rules to adopt the
Gates abolition of Aguilar/Spinelli,142 so it obviously was well aware
of it. Although codification of constitutional law may well be
desirable in civilian life as well, it is particularly easy to apply in the
military, given the daily awareness of, and reliance of the armed
forces on, periodically changed service regulations and directives.
The services are not in agreement on the binding effect of the rules.
The Air Force Court of Military Review, for example, !mally has held
that it is bound by the rules.1 43 Although infrequent, the Court of
Military Appeals, however, still is playing fast and loose with the
rules,144 thus abdicating not only its own judicial responsibilities, but
also its role as supervisor and "role model" for the subordinate
military courts.

139\Vhile concededly the "plain meaning" school of statutory analysts hru. ll!> dtf·
ficulties, the e.xtraordinarily careful drafting of the rules, insofar as what was ··fixed''
and absolute and what was clearly and e.xpressly designed to change with ca.sc law
makes the Fbstle declaration extraordinarily difficult to accept. When other facton.
are added-the "legislative" history and the subsequent re\ision history of tht> rul~-lt
becomes incredible.
· 140I note drolly that in the worldwide lectures that Commandt>r J>mnell and I
presented in 1980 and, I believe, in my 1984 Homer Ferguson Lt>cture, I routinely com·
mented that we often had "set the rules in concrete" to ensure certainty and
predictability.
141Pursuant to DOD Directive 5500.17 (January Hl85). th<' Jotnt St>n·tc<' l'ommtUN•
on Military Justice is required to perform an annual re\'lew of the ~lanual for Court!>·
Martial and to forward to the DOD General Counsel's Office proposab for revtsion.
See general1y Garrett, RRjlecticms au Omtempomry Samn'S qf.\lililary !Au·, Til<' Anny
Lawyer, Feb. 1987, at 38, 40. This process has worked well, and the ~tanual has been
amended a number of times as a result. Gilligan & Smith, s11pm note -1-1. at 8S n.-19.
14220 M.J. at 642.
143United States v. Johnson, 21 1\f.J. 553, 556-57 (A . F.C.~t.lt HJ&=i) («.'n bane).
144See United States v. Conner, 27 M.J. 378 (C.M.A. 1989) (discussed supm not<' 66).
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If one accepts the statement that the Military Rules of Evidence
are binding and that some courts, including the Court of Military Appeals, are choosing not to follow them, one must ask why judicial
resistance exists.
I would posit that the core of judicial resistance to the rules is
nothing more-or less-than the traditional reluctance of AngloAmerican judges to be bound by statute. Both our legal system and
our law schools are case oriented.145 The emphasis in law school is
on understanding precedent and applying it. In the process we all
too often convey the message that the only limit that exists to caseand statutory-interpretation is the creativity of the student.
Students then become lawyers wedded to the adversary system who
consequently, as zealous advocates, must argue the interpretation
most favorable to the client, subject only to the slight limitations of
professional ethics. When counsel ascends to the bench, the entire
system emphasizes the judge's individual independence and power,
albeit one usually subject to appellate review. It would hardly be surprising then that many judges would find themselves disinclined to
take seriously evidentiary rules, particularly unique evidentiary rules
that limit what was nearly unfettered individual creativity, especially
if the rules prohibited a result that the court would like to reach.
The price of judicial noncompliance with the Military Rules of
Evidence is plain: the appellate courts that are engaging in this not
so genteel resistance deprive the military criminal legal system of
its predictability and stability. Of perhaps greater significance, they
call into question their own legitimacy under the law.

VIII. THE RULES: APPRAISAL AND FUTURE
The Military Rules of Evidence are now a fixture of military legal
practice. Law students who become military lawyers find the evidentiary rules applicable to courts-martial substantially identical with
the majority rules in force in the United States. Civilian attorneys
who appear before courts-martial are not hindered by unique, outmoded, rules easily subject to individual judicial interpretation.
Perhaps even more important, the creation of the rules gave birth
to what appears to be a continuing, active, and successful military
law reform effort. The Military Rules of Evidence have not been
placed in the Manual for Courts-Martial and abandoned to the ravages
of time; rather, they have been revised periodically as thought ap14.•Which to some degree' is surprising when one considers the ever in<T(•asing impact not only of statutes but, most especially, of administrative rules.
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propriate to adopt changes in the law.l46 Even as this article is being
written, the process is under way to adopt the recent change to
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a).
The periodic spasm of judicial indifference and resistance to the
rules is troublesome, particularly inasmuch as it sends signals to the
trial bench. Should it continue, it may undermine the rules in toto.
At present, however, it might be viewed as occasional obstructions
on the expressway; that is, the careful driver must take note of the
hazards and accommodate them, but the speedy progress forward
usually is not affected significantly.
The Military Rules of Evidence not only routinely govern trials by
courts-martial worldwide, but also guide law enforcement personnel and commanders in their daily need to protect the rights of
military personnel while they enforce the law. The apparatus that
gave rise to the rules continues to function. It has given birth to the
Rules for Courts-Martial and has assisted in the revision of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. In the future, the military will
amend the rules as society and law change. The structure behind
them should ensure a vibrant military legal system at the forefront
of criminal justice in the United States. Colonel Alley wrought well!
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Gilligan & Smith, supra note 44, at 85 n..t9;
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